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THE "WALKA WAY SHOP": LONG-TERM UNION
AVOIDANCE AND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS TO OPEN
NEW FACILITIES AS LAWFUL CONDUCT UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
1. INTRODUCTION

Picture this scenario: 1 Unionized employees of a major
manufacturer go on strike. Eventually, the strike ends and everything
returns to normal. A few years later, the employer expands its
operations, and instead of assigning the new work to the existing
unionized facility, the employer chooses to locate the work at a new
facility that will not utilize the unionized employees. The reasons for
the decision include a generous financial package provided by the
state where the new facility will be located and the employer's desire
to avoid the impact of subsequent strikes on its operations. If this
decision to open a new facility is part of the employer's long-term
union avoidance strategy, does such conduct constitute an unfair
labor practice? If not, should it? And if it does not, in what
circumstances should long-term union avoidance constitute an unfair
labor practice?
The recent dispute involving the Boeing Company (Boeing) and
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
District Lodge No. 751 (lAM) presents a ripe opportunity for
considering these questions. 2 Fortunately, the Boeing case was
settled, and no National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision was
necessary. 3 Unfortunately, whether Boeing's conduct would have
been deemed an unfair labor practice remains unknown. In one
sense, the system for adjudicating charges of unfair labor practices
worked as it should: The union filed a charge, the NLRB regional

1.

2.
3.

This scenario is based on the facts of the dispute between the Boeing Company and
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers District Lodge
No. 751. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
See Complaint and Notice of Hearing at 6-7, Boeing Co. v. Int'! Ass'n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers Dist. Lodge 751, Case 19-CA-3243I (N:L.R.B. Apr. 20, 2011).
Fred Feinstein, Boeing Settlement Showcases the Value of Collective Bargaining, THE
HILL (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://thehill.comlblogs/congress-blog/labor/199945boeing-settlement-showcases-the-value-of-collective-bargaining ("As happened in the
Boeing negotiations, the most common outcome of a complaint issued by the General
Counsel is a settlement. In fact, more than 90 percent of complaints issued by the
General Counsel of the NLRB are settled.").
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director conducted an investigation, the NLRB General Counsel
issued a complaint, an Administrative Law Judge began reviewing
the case, and the parties settled before a decision was reached. 4 On
the other hand, the settlement is unfortunate because no decision was
rendered, and therefore, it remains uncertain whether conduct such as
Boeing's constitutes an unfair labor practice. 5
The critical issue that arises out of the Boeing dispute is not
whether there were any unfair labor practices in that case specifically;
rather, it is whether long-term union avoidance as embodied in
capital allocation decisions constitutes or should constitute an unfair
labor practice. To begin the task of answering this question, Part II
of this comment discusses the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) and briefly summarizes the facts of
the Boeing dispute. 6 This background provides a foundation for the
subsequent discussion in Part III, which labels long-term union
avoidance as manifested through capital allocation decisions as a
"walkaway shop.,,7 Part IV sets forth a framework in which
walkaway shops should be analyzed. 8 In so doing, Part IV
distinguishes long-term union avoidance from transfers of work 9 and
analogizes such avoidance to partial closings. 10 Ultimately, this
comment argues that a walkaway shop should constitute an unfair
labor practice only when the circumstances indicate an employer's
purpose to chill union activity at either the existing unionized plant or
the newly created non-union facility.ll
II. THE NLRA AND THE BOEING DISPUTE
A. The Purpose of the NLRA

The specific focus of this comment is how management decisions
regarding new work should be analyzed under section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA, which preserves employees' right to engage in protected
activity by prohibiting employer discrimination based on such
employee conduct. 12 As amended by the Labor Management
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

For an overview of NLRB procedures, see Unfair Labor Practices Process Chart,
NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://nlrb.gov/node/3947(lastvisitedDec.11 ,2012).
See discussion if!fraParts II.B.1-3, IV.
See discussion infra Part II.A-B.1.
See discussion if!fra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Parts lILA, IV.C.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.s.C. § 158(a) (2006) (making it "an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
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Relations Act, the NLRA seeks to protect employees' right to engage
in unionism while also delineating "the legitimate rights of both
employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce.,,13
Thus, at the heart of the Act is the notion that "[i]ndustrial strife ...
can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees,
and labor organizations each recognize under law one another's
legitimate rights in their relations with each other .... ,,14
These statements make clear that there are rights afforded and
obligations imposed upon each of the three stakeholders in labor
relations--employers, employees, and labor organizations. 15 In the
context of an employer's decision to create new work at a new
facility, whether certain employer conduct should constitute an unfair
labor practice comes down to finding a balance between employee
and employer rights. 16 This comment suggests that an appropriate
balance between employer and employee rights exists when
employers are permitted to make capital allocation decisions and
employees receive protection from employer conduct that is intended
to stifle protected section 7 activity.17 Employers will have the ability
to make core entrepreneurial decisions and employees' rights will
receive protection under the NLRA. 18
As stated by acting NLRB General Counsel Lafe Solomon, "A
worker's right to strike is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
National Labor Relations Act. . .. We also recognize the rights of
employers to make business decisions based on their economic
interests, but they must do so within the law.,,19 Accordingly, the
core issue in an analysis of a management decision to create new

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization"); see also Peter F. Munger, Stephen X.
Munger & Thomas J. Munger, Plant Closures and Relocations Under the National
Labor Relations Act,S GA. ST. U. L. REv. 77, 78-79 (1988) (discussing section
8(a)(3)'s prohibition against discrimination).
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2006).
Id.
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 151-169.
See discussion infra Part N.
Section 7 of the NLRA states in part, "Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing." National Labor Relations Act, § 157.
See discussion infra Part N.C.4-5.
Press Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. Issues Complaint
Against Boeing Co. for Unlawfully Transferring Work to a Non-Union Facility (Apr.
20,
2011),
https:llwww.nlrb.gov/news/national-labor-re1ations-board-issuescomplaint-against-boeing-company-unlawfully-transferring-.
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work is whether such a decision infringes upon fundamental rights
guaranteed to employees by the NLRA.20
The Boeing dispute provides the impetus for considering whether
the NLRA adequately addresses management decisions regarding the
creation of new work or whether the Act should be amended or
reinterpreted to better serve its underlying policies.

B. The Boeing Dispute
1. The Complaint

On April 20, 2011, the NLRB issued a complaint against Boeing
for conduct in violation of sections 8(a)(I) and 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA.21
The complaint alleged that Boeing interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their section 7
rights in violation of section 8(a)(I), and that Boeing discriminated
"in regard to the hire or tenure or terms or conditions of employment
of its employees, thereby discouraging membership in a labor
organization in violation of [sections] 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. ,,22
The complaint stated that Boeing "made coercive statements to its
employees that it would remove or had removed work from the Unit
because employees had struck and [Boeing] threatened or impliedly
threatened that the Unit would lose additional work in the event of
future strikes.'>23 Additionally, the complaint alleged that Boeing
decided to transfer a production line from the existing Unie4 at the
company's Puget Sound facility in Washington State to a new, nonunion facility in South Carolina. 25
While this comment is not about the merits of the Boeing dispute
specifically, the conduct noted in the complaint raises important
issues concerning how the NLRA treats an employer's long-term
union avoidance. 26 The issue addressed here is whether long-term
union avoidance as manifested through capital allocation decisions
should constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3).27
2. Distinguishing New Work from a "Runaway Shop"
20.

21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

See discussion supra Part II.
Complaint, supra note 2, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 4.
The unit referred to in the complaint is comprised of the employees of Boeing as set
forth in the collective bargaining agreement between Boeing and lAM and includes
"all production and maintenance employees in Washington State." Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 7-8.
See discussion infra Parts lILA, IV.
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While the General Counsel's complaint alleged that Boeing
unlawfully transferred work/ 8 this is not the case. Boeing did not
transfer work; it opened a new facility that engaged in new work. 29
Thus, the issue here is not whether there has been an unfair labor
practice in the form of an unlawful transfer or plant relocation; this is
not an example of a "runaway shop.,,30 A runaway shop occurs when
an employer transfers or relocates work from a unionized facility in
retaliation for employees' union activity.3l The label "runaway shop"
was created to identify situations where an employer would close a
unionized facility and transfer the work to a new, non-union facility
with the purpose of evading the employer's obligations to interact
with the union. 32
Based on the definition above, a decision to open a new facility that
will engage in new work is not a runaway shop because no work has
been lost at the existing facility. Hence, in the Boeing dispute,
Boeing's decision to open a new facility in South Carolina is not a
runaway shop because there was no loss of work at the existing
unionized plant in Washington. 33 In fact, the number of workers at
Boeing's Puget Sound facility increased. 34
28.
29.

30.

31.
32.

33.

34.

Complaint, supra note 2, at 5-7.
See Steven M. Bernstein, The NLRB's Boeing Dreamliner Complaint: A Tangled Web
of Legal and Political Controversy, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 2, 2011, at 13-15;
Philip A. Miscimarra, Capital Investment, Relocations, and Major Business Changes
Under the NLRA, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 79, 89 (2011); Richard A. Epstein,
Senseless in Seattle, DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/
publications/ defining-ideas/articlel7650 I.
See E. Walter Bowman, Note, Plant Relocation: Viewed After Denial of Eriforcement
of Board's "Runaway Shop" Remedy in Garwin, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1062, 1062 (1966)
("Plant relocation...,-the transfer of all or a portion of plant operations to another sitecan present two distinct categories of labor relations problems: (I) unfair labor
practice problems under the National Labor Relations Act ('runaway shop' problems);
and (2) problems of interpreting and applying a collective bargaining agreement.").
Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483,491 (lith Cir. 1982).
Jan W. Sturner, An Analysis of the NLRB's "Runaway Shop" Doctrine in the Context
of Mid-Term Work Relocations Based on Union Labor Costs, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. U. 289, 289-90 (2000).
See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Federal Labor Board's Assault on Boeing Will Cost Many
Jobs, S.F. EXAMINER, June 19,2011, at 18, available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/
opinionlop-eds/2011/06/federal-labor-board-s-assault-boeing-will-cost-rnany-jobs.
Epstein, supra note 29 ("[U]nlike the employer's decision in Darlington Mills,
Boeing's decision to open a new facility in South Carolina did not take away the job
of a single worker in Washington state or the Portland area. Indeed, Boeing has
expanded its workforce in that region by 2,000 workers."); see also Furchtgott-Roth,
supra note 33, at 18.
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3. Why a New Classification is Needed
Because the creation of new work does not fit squarely within
existing tests used by the NLRB to determine whether an unfair labor
practice has been committed,35 it is necessary to develop a framework
by which such management decisions can be analyzed. The question
of how to treat an employer's capital allocation decisions is not new.
For example, Professor Cynthia Estlund has commented that she has
"been unable to locate any decisions holding that a withholding of
capital investment from a union plant, or a decision not to place new
or expanded operations at the plant, was discriminatory under
[section] 8(a)(3)."36 Thus, under the current interpretation of the
NLRA, "[i]t appears to be necessary ... to show that existing unit
work was eliminated, subcontracted, or relocated.,,37
In light of calls for a broader interpretation of the NLRA,38 this
comment addresses how decisions regarding new work should be
treated under the Act. 39 In so doing, it suggests an approach that
strives to preserve the legitimate rights of employers and employees 40
without infringing too far upon management's right to make core
entrepreneurial decisions,41 or employees' right to engage in
protected activity. 42
As will be discussed in Part IV, a management decision to create
new work at a new facility, by itself, is not and should not be seen as
conduct that violates section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 43 Indeed, as former
NLRB Chairman Peter Schaumber has noted regarding the Boeing
dispute, finding an unfair labor practice in such a decision could have
a negative impact on the economy.44 Schaumber contends that "[t]he
filing [of this complaint] threatens job growth and a sustained
economic recovery today," and asks, "What domestic or foreign
employer will want to maintain a U.S. presence or create a new one if
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See discussion infra Part IV.A-C.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding
the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEx. L. REv. 921, 943 n.80 (1993).
Id.
See id.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See infra text accompanying notes 148-50; cf National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part IV.
Peter Schaumber, NLRB's Chief Lawyer Should Stop Obstructing Congress,
WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Nov. 15, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.coml
article/41438#.UKmWg-Oe9rd ("[W]e know the filing of this complaint is chilling
business investment in the United States, and for good reason.").
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the federal government can dictate the employer's core
entrepreneurial decisions-where to locate, relocate, transfer or
outsource?,"'5
While decisions to relocate, transfer, and outsource can be
evaluated under existing applications of the NLRA,46 decisions
concerning where to locate new work are in a class of their own. 47
An underlying reason for finding such decisions lawful under the
NLRA is that a decision to open a new plant with new workers,
which does not negatively impact existing employees, is
economicallyefficient. 48 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that
certain decisions are rightfully within the purview of management,49
and the Court's decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB implies that management has the right to make certain
decisions affecting the direction of the business without interference
from the union or employees. 50
At the very least, clarity is needed: management and labor,
employers and employees, and politicians and the public need
guidelines on what constitutes an unfair labor practice with respect to
this type of management decision. 51 The ambiguity surrounding the
Boeing dispute and the hyper-politicization of the public debate on
that matter beg for clarification that will be useful in America's
economic recovery. 52
45.

46.
47.
48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

Jd. According to Schaumber, "[The complaint] seeks to eviscerate the distinction long
protected by the law between a core managerial decision based on the economic
consequences of unionization and a management decision based on an employer's
hostility toward its employees' union activities." Id.
See discussion infra Part III.
See Estlund, supra note 36, at 943 n.80.
See Jeffrey D. Hedlund, Note, An Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining over
Partial Termination and Plant Collection Decisions, 95 YALE L.J. 949, 953-54 (1986)
("By definition, economic efficiency is enhanced when parties make exchanges that
leave one party better off without leaving the other worse off").
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965)
(holding that an employer can lawfully close its entire business but cannot undertake a
discriminatory partial closing).
See First Nat'! Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981) ("Congress had no
expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the
running ofthe business enterprise in which the union's members are employed.").
See Schaumber, supra note 44 (arguing that Congress must act in the Boeing dispute
and that businesses will not want to open plants in the United States if they run the
risk of being unable to make certain business decisions).
See Andrew Strom, Boeing and the NLRB-A 64-Year-Old Time Bomb Explodes, 68
NAT'L LAW. GUILD 109, 110 (2011) (discussing how the Boeing complaint set off a
"fire storm"); Schaumber, supra note 44 (discussing the harm to the U.S. economy
caused by Congress' failure to clarify issues surrounding new work).
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III. THE "WALKAWAY SHOP"
A. Defining "Walkaway Shop"

Part II discussed the prototypical runaway shop-when an
employer closes a union plant and transfers that work to a non-union
facility. 53 To distinguish long-term union avoidance from the shortterm union avoidance evidenced in a runaway shop, this comment
labels an employer's long-term union avoidance strategy a
"walkaway shop." While long-term union avoidance is not a new
concept,54 labeling the practice a walkaway shop is helpful for a
variety of reasons. First, because of the existence of the term
"runaway shop," the label "walkaway shop" provides for a simple
comparison of certain employer conduct, eliciting an image of an
employer's prolonged union avoidance strategy. Second, beyond the
similarities with a runaway shop (that an employer is avoiding a
union), the conduct walkaway shop describes is inherently
different-there is no transfer of work and no immediate loss of work
as a result of the employer's decision. 55
Thus, the label
acknowledges that an employer is avoiding unionism while
cautioning against rigidly categorizing management decisions under
pre-existing labels. A walkaway shop is a gradual undertaking that
mayor may not result in a loss of union jobs down the road. It is
nothing more than a long-term union avoidance strategy as
manifested through capital allocation decisions regarding the creation
of new work. 56
B. Critiques a/Long-Term Union Avoidance

A walkaway shop should be lawful as described above because
capital allocation decisions are the type of decisions that have been
classified as management's to make. 57 This premise, however, is not
uniformly agreed upon, and there are some who would find an unfair
labor practice in the decision to allocate capital to a new location
itself, regardless of whether the employer's purpose is to chill
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 36, at 945--46.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
See Terry Collingsworth, Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act-Plant
Closings and Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
72,73 (1993) (discussing how in Darlington, "[t]he Court stated that without a clearer
indication of congressional intent, it would not alter the fundamental assumption of
the American economic system that decisions about the use of capital belong
exclusively to its owners").
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unionism. 58 For instance, Professor Estlund argues that there is a
basis in the text of the NLRA "for pressing beyond the existing limits
of the antidiscrimination mandate.,,59
Professor Estlund has
commented that the NLRA "unequivocally condemns some rational
employer conduct that would serve the firm's economic selfinterest.,,60 An example of such condemned conduct is section
8(a)(3)'s "prohibition on anti-union discrimination," which makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate in regard to the hire, tenure,
or terms of employment of unionized workers. 61 Estlund believes
that the NLRA's "sweeping language embodies a solid statutory
mandate for going beyond current doctrine in curtailing employers'
rational, market-driven conduct when it is necessary to enforce
employees' right to choose and to act through unionization.,,62 The
question is whether the language of section 8(a)(3) should be read to
limit management decisions regarding new work.
In her work, Estlund addresses "which employer decisions that
eliminate jobs violate the NLRA.,,63 In the context of a new plant, the
question becomes whether an employer violates the NLRA by
opening a new, non-union facility in order to avoid the costs of
unionization, when at the time the decision is made, there is no
detrimental impact on the unionized facility.64 Professor Estlund's
framework provides great assistance in answering the question posed
in this comment. As Estlund notes, "Union avoidance in investment
decisions is widespread.,,65 As an example, Boeing's decision to
open a new facility in South Carolina is clearly union avoidance in an
investment decision,66 regardless of whether the decision is lawful or
unlawful. Not all union avoidance, however, is or should be
unlawful. 67
58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

See Estlund, supra note 36, at 946-64.
Jd. at 927.
Jd. at 922.
Jd. at 922 & n.2.
Estlund characterized "[tJhe prohibition on anti-union
discrimination" as "perhaps the least controversial and most fundamental of the
NLRA's constraints on employers." Jd. at 922.
Jd. at 928.
Jd. at 926.
See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B.3.
Estlund, supra note 36, at 926.
See Complaint, supra note 2, at 1-8 (alleging that past strikes at Boeing's Puget
Sound operations were part of the rationale for Boeing's decision to open a new plant
in South Carolina).
See Estlund, supra note 36, at 926. As Estlund states:
At least some capital investment decisions that eliminate union
jobs are subject to scrutiny under the Act's antidiscrimination
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Estlund suggests that at the very least there should be mandatory
bargaining over capital allocation decisions,68 given the historical
rationale for the NLRA.69 Indeed, she finds flaws in the current
interpretation of the Act and suggests that "the requirement of motive
in these cases, and particularly the crucial dichotomy between antiunion motives and economically rational motives, misconceives the
nature of anti-union animus and thereby defines the range of
prohibited employer conduct too narrowly.,,70 She is not alone. 71
Others note that management's capital allocation decisions affect job
security at existing plants. 72
Where Estlund argues that the current interpretation of the NLRA
provides a too-confined scope of prohibited activity,73 this comment
argues that such conduct should not, absent more explicit anti-union
discrimination, be found to violate the NLRA. While this comment
ultimately concludes that a walkaway shop should not in and of itself
constitute an unfair labor practice, it also suggests that the current
NLRA framework for analyzing management decisions should be
modified to define when such decisions cross the line to the point of
becoming an unfair labor practice. 74 In order to explain this
distinction, it is necessary to understand how the existing analysis of
requirement and may be unlawful if they are found to have been
motivated by "anti-union animus." But anti-union animus is
defined in contrast to legitimate "economic" motives, which
include efforts to avoid costs associated with unionization-in
particular, higher labor costs.

68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

73.
74.

Id.
See id. at 979-80.
See id. at 926-28 (arguing that the history and purpose of the NLRA support a broader
interpretation of what employer conduct is prohibited).
Id. at 926.
See Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 73 (discussing how the Supreme Court has
"interpreted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to protect the right of the
owners of capital to make fundamental entrepreneurial decisions, affecting the nature
and direction of the business, without interference from workers"); Christopher
Hexter et aI., Twenty-Five Years of Developments in the Law Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299, 304 (20lO) ("[T]he very notion
of a broad range of 'core entrepreneurial functions' exempt from bargaining is
contrary to the Act's policies.").
Richard Litvin, Fearfol Asymmetry: Employee Free Choice and Employer
Profitability in First National Maintenance, 58 IND. LJ. 433, 442 (1984) ("Many
significant management decisions in pursuit of profit or efficiency threaten the job
security of some employees. In deciding to produce a new product, an employer may
commit capital that it could have invested in maintaining or improving its existing
products.").
Estlund, supra note 36, at 926.
See infra Part V.
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management decisions under the NLRA would apply to a decision to
invest in a new facility.
IV. ANALYZING WALKAWAY SHOPS
In determining whether a management decision to open a new
facility constitutes an unfair labor practice, this comment begins with
the assumption that decisions regarding new work should be treated
differently from decisions that result in the loss of union work. 75
There is something to be gleaned, however, from the existing test for
partial closings that can help delineate when a walkaway shop should
constitute an unfair labor practice. While section 8(a)(3) does not
currently prohibit new investment decisions when there is no
relocation, transfer, or removal of work,16 the framework proposed
below strives to create a system in which such decisions do not
necessarily constitute an unfair labor practice, but could in certain
situations. 77 In so doing, the proposed analysis of walkaway shops
strikes a balance that protects the rights of both employers and
employees. 78
As a starting point, it is helpful to consider the following statement
from Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB: "It is well settled that
an employer violates the NLRA by taking adverse employment
action in order to discourage union activity.,,79 Inherent in this
statement is the notion that there is no unfair labor practice if there
has been no adverse employment action. 80 Thus, while section
8(a)(3) places limits on what an employer can do in response to union
activity,8! when the employer's decision involves neither a discharge

75.

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Robert VerBruggen. Pulling Labor Law Out of Thin Air, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Apr. 28,
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.comlarticles/265835/pulling-labor-lawout-thin-air-robert-verbruggen ("It would seem odd for decisions about brand-new
capacity to be treated the same as decisions to destroy existing capacity or fire
workers ....").
Miscimarra, supra note 29, at 88-89 (discussing how section 8(a)(3) does not prohibit
new investment decisions that do not involve relocations, transfers, or removal of
work).
See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
See id.
Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 83 (discussing how section 8(a)(3) "limits the
freedom an employer otherwise would have to discharge employees or otherwise
retaliate in response to union organizing activity").
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nor adverse employment action, the limits sections 8(a)(3) and
8(a)(1) impose on employers should be different. 82
A capital allocation decision creating new work at a new plant has
no negative impact if one agrees with the assumption taken here that
not obtaining the new work is not an injury inflicted upon the existing
unionized employees. 83 Indeed, decisions regarding new work fit
within the description articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing
Co.: "Naturally, certain business decisions will, to some degree,
interfere with concerted activities by employees. But it is only when
the interference with [section] 7 rights outweighs the business
justification for the employer's action that [section] 8(a)(1) is
violated.,,84 Moreover, "[w]hatever may be the limits of [section]
8(a)(1), some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of
management prerogative that they would never constitute violations
of [section] 8(a)(1), whether or not they involved sound business
judgment, unless they also violated [section] 8(a)(3)."85
Given this backdrop, determining how to analyze walkaway shops
is necessary in order to discern when long-term union avoidance
constitutes an unfair labor practice. 86 To accomplish this task, the
following sections compare and contrast walkaway shops with
transfers of work and partial closings.

A. Transfers of Work
In one category of management decisions, transfers of work, the
standard established in NLRB v. Wright Line is used to determine
whether the employer violated section 8(a)(3).87 The Wright Line
standard is a logical starting point, because in the Boeing dispute, the
employer's conduct was dubbed a transfer of work. 88
Under Wright Line:
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a
prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that
82.

83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Estlund, supra note 36, at 943 n.80 (discussing how a management decision to
open a new plant that does not negatively impact existing employees is not conduct
currently prohibited by the NLRA).
See VerBruggen, supra note 75. But see Strom, supra note 52, at 112-13 (arguing
that the distinction between new work and a transfer of existing work should be
"irrelevant").
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965).
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 110-20.
NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 (1st CiT. 1981).
Complaint, supra note 2, at 5.
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protected conduct was a "motivating factor" in the
employer's decision. Once this is established, the burden
will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same
action would have taken place even in the absence of the
protected conduct. 89
The Wright Line standard is inappropriate in the context of a
walkaway shop because there is no loss of union jobs when the
capital allocation decision is made. 90 Moreover, inherent in the
concept of a walkaway shop is long-term union avoidance. 91
Therefore, if Wright Line were to be applied, an employer would
always lose-the General Counsel would always be able to make its
first stage case, and the employer's rebuttal would fail because the
employer would not be able to show that the capital allocation
decision would have been made in the absence of the protected
conduct.
Thus, distinguishing the creation of new work from the transfer of
work is appropriate for two reasons. First, a walkaway shop involves
no immediate loss of work, which is in direct contrast to an unlawful
runaway shop.92 Second, refraining from using the Wright Line
standard acknowledges that employers should be able to make capital
allocation decisions based on a long-term union avoidance strategy
instead of having to demonstrate legitimate economic reasons to
justify employer conduct under section 8(a)(3).93
Creating new work at a new, non-union facility because of the costs
associated with past strikes or the possibility of future strikes is
distinct from a transfer of work. 94 Again, the Wright Line standard is
inappropriate because it emphasizes union animus, which is less
critical in the walkaway shop scenario. 95 One should not even reach
the issue of animus if there has been no detrimental impact on

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083,1089 (1980).
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See Munger et ai., supra note 12, at 80 & n.l6.
See id. at 80.
See Capehorn Indus., 336 N.L.R.B. 364, 366-67 (2001).
See NLRB v. Transp. Mgrnt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983). There is a difference
between a decision to open a new plant without discharging any existing employees
and a decision to transfer work such as what occurred in Transportation Management.
In that case, the Court stated, "Soon after the passage of the [NLRAJ, the Board held
that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge a worker where
antiunion animus actually contributed to the discharge decision." Id.
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employees. 96 The critical issue in determining whether a walkaway
shop is unlawful under the NLRA should not be generic union
animus; rather, it should be an employer's specific purpose to chill
union activity. Emphasizing the employer's purpose is the better
approach because it will enable the NLRB to focus on an employer's
efforts to impede employees in the exercise of protected section 7
activity. 97
An employer's decision to open a new plant should reasonably be
viewed by the unionized employees as the type of decision
management is expected to make. 98 After all, it is no secret that
employers generally oppose unionization. 99 Instead, management
decisions to open new facilities should be analyzed under a variation
of the test used for partial closings. 100
B. Partial Closings

At first glance, a walkaway shop is quite dissimilar from a partial
closing because no closing occurs when there is a walkaway shop. 101
There are in fact, however, similarities between the two types of
decisions. With a walkaway shop, there is the potential for the
management decision to chill unionization at the new plant and
protected activity at the existing unionized facility. With a partial
closing, there is the potential for chilling unionization at any facilities
that have not been closed; however, because the unionized facility
has been closed, there is no chilling of protected activity at that
plant. 102 As stated by Collingsworth, "[B]enefits do accrue to an
employer who engages in a 'partial closing,' in that any remaining
. employees at the employer's other facilities are likely to be
discouraged in the exercise of their section 7 rights." 103
Under the current application of the NLRA, a partial closing is
illegal, "only if the employer's interest in some other business
allowed him to obtain ongoing benefit from the closing."I04
Moreover, "[a] prima facie case of a section 8(a)(3) violation is
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 401 ("[T]he Board's decisions ... have consistently held that the unfair labor
practice consists of a discharge or other adverse action that is based in whole or in part
on antiunion animus-{)r ... that the employee's protected conduct was a substantial
or motivating factor in the adverse action.").
See Munger et aI., supra note 12, at 80-81.
See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 36, at 926.
See id. at 928-29.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
!d. at 87-88.
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established if the General Counsel for the [NLRB] makes a showing
that employee conduct protected by the NLRA was the motivating
factor behind the employer's decision to close or relocate a plant."lo5
In contrast, with a walkaway shop, whether employee conduct
motivated the decision should not be considered beyond being used
in determining whether the employer's motive is to chill unionism.
Indeed, what matters is the purpose of the employer's decision, as
is the case with partial closings. 106 With walkaway shops, however,
the inquiry into purpose should also consider whether the employer
was motivated by a purpose to chill unionism at the existing
unionized plant. Such a consideration would represent a departure
from Darlington, where the inquiry was into whether there was a
purpose to chill union activity at any remaining plants. 107 This
comment suggests that the analysis for determining whether a
walkaway shop constitutes an unfair labor practice should include an
expanded version of the Darlington test. IOS If the test turns on
whether there is a motive to chill unionism, then there can be
protection for both the employee's interest in protected activity as
well as the employer's interest in making core entrepreneurial
decisions.
Applied to a walkaway shop, the decision to open a new plant
should be unlawful under the NLRA if the employer's purpose was to
chill unionized activity at either the existing unionized plant or the
newly created facility. This expansion is necessary because the
NLRA should afford protection to unionized workers whose
protected conduct is the target of the employer's decision.

105. Mungeret ai., supra note 12, at 80-81.
106. See Joel F. Herold, Note, Wages, Workers, and Potential Windfalls: Rethinking
Section 8(a)(3) Labor Disputes in a Capitalist Economy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657,
661 (1998) ("Motive is the key factor in detennining whether an employer's actions
violated section 8(a)(3).").
107. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).
108. Id.; see also John O'Connor, Employers Be Forewarned: An Employer's Guide to

Plant Closing and Layoff Decisions After the Enactment of the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, 16 OHlO N.U. L. REv. 19,24 (1989) (discussing how
in Darlington the owner instituted a partial closing in order to "chill unionism in other
parts of the business . . . because they were . . . motivated by a desire to stop
unionization in the owner's other plants and the owner reasonably could have foreseen
that the closing would have that intended effect"). Thus, one can see that finding an
unfair labor practice in a walkaway shop where the employer's purpose to chill
unionism at either the existing unionized plant or the new non-union plant is simply
an extension of the logic in Darlington.
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C. Expanding Darlington's Test for Partial Closings

The analysis of a walkaway shop should therefore proceed as
follows. As in Boeing, there is a unionized plant. 109 The employer
opens a new plant without any loss of jobs at the existing unionized
facility. If the purpose of the decision is to chill union activity at
either plant, then this conduct should constitute an unfair labor
practice. llo If there is no purpose to chill protected activity, then
there is no unfair labor practice. III
This is not, however, the end of the analysis. The NLRA process
will need to be used to determine whether there is an unfair labor
practice if the employer subsequently decides to close the union
facility. I 12 At this point, the existing partial closing analysis should
be applied. I 13 The test for whether partial closings violate section
8(a)(3) is set forth in Darlington. 1l4 There, the Supreme Court stated,
"[A] partial closing. . . is an unfair labor practice under [section]
8(a)(3) if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the
remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may
reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that
effect.,,115
Thus, the Darlington test should be applied twice. The NLRB will
look into the employer's purpose both when the capital allocation
decision is made and again when, and if, there is a partial closing.
Under Darlington, there has been a violation of section 8(a)(3) if the
following three-part test is satisfied:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being
closed for antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another
business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the
same line of commercial activity as the closed plant, of
sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping a
benefit from the discouragement of unionization in that
business; (2) act to close their plant with the purpose of
producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship to the
other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that

109. See discussion supra Part I1.B.l.
110. See Darlington, 380 U.S. at 275.
Ill. Thomas J. Schwartz, Plant Relocation or Partial Termination-the Duty to DecisionBargain, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 81, 89 (1970).
112. See discussion supra Part I1.A.
113. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
114. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 268-69.
115. Id.at275.
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its employees will fear that such business will also be closed
down if they persist in organizational activities .... 116
To determine whether there has been an unlawful chilling effect,
the NLRB considers three factors:
(1) [A]ny contemporaneous union activity at the facility to
be closed and at the employer's other plants; (2) the
geographic proximity of the employer's remaining plants to
the closed facility; (3) the likelihood that employees at the
remaining plants willieam of the circumstances surrounding
the closure through employee interchange or contact; and
(4) any representations made by the employer's agents to
other employees. I 17
With a walkaway shop, the NLRB would consider these factors,
but they would first be analyzed in the context of a plant that has not
been closed, but has instead not been selected for new work. A
partial closing violates the NLRA "only when it is carried out with
the intent and for the purpose of avoiding one's obligations under the
ACt.,,118 Thus, a decision to open and operate a new facility away
from an existing unionized facility would constitute an unfair labor
practice only if the decision was made with the purpose to chill
protected activity. I 19

116. Id. at 275-76.
117. Munger et aI., supra note 12, at 82 (citing Bruce Duncan Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1243
(1977); George Lithograph Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 431, 431-32 (1973); Motor Repair,
Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083 (1968».
118. Bowman, supra note 30, at 1064.
119. Even if one agrees with critiques of the motive requirement in plant relocation cases, a
distinction between a plant relocation and creation of new work should at least be
considered because with new work there is not necessarily any loss of union jobs. See
discussion supra Part II.B.2. Accordingly, one could agree with Estlund that motive
should not be required in a relocation case while also agreeing that motive is a proper
consideration when an employer makes a capital allocation decision that results in no
loss of work at an existing unionized facility. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 934-35
(discussing how a relocation violates section 8(a)(3) only where the employer is
"motivated by a purpose to avoid dealing with a union or to discourage union
activity") .
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1. Employer Statements

An employer's statements should be considered in the analysis
undertaken to determine the employer's purpose.1 20 If the employer
makes illegal statements in relation to its capital allocation decision,
these statements should point toward a purpose to chill unionism.
Here, the NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. standard should be applied. 121
Thus, in the Boeing dispute, the NLRB would consider whether
comments accompanying the decision to locate the new production
line in South Carolina constituted coercive speech that would
discourage unionized workers from engaging in protected section 7
activity in the future.
As stated in Gissel, "[A]n employer is free to communicate to his
employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his
specific views about a particular union, so long as the
communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit. ",122 And if the employer makes a prediction, that
prediction "must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to
convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable
consequences beyond his control.,,123 Accordingly, a management
decision to open a new facility as part of a walkaway shop strategy
would constitute an unfair labor practice if the decision is
accompanied by any statement that could reasonably influence
employees in their exercise of protected section 7 rights, is a threat,
or is a prediction that does not meet the Gissel standard, because such
statements would be strong evidence of a purpose to chill
unionism. 124
2. Extensive Investigation into the Employer's Purpose Will Often
Be Necessary
As part of the analysis, it is necessary to consider whether the
employer's conduct "carrie[d] with it an inference of unlawful
intention so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the
Thus, in
employer's protestations of innocent purpose.,,125
considering the employer's purpose, the investigation will inquire
into the true motives of the employer by examining circumstantial
120.

Cf NLRB v. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc. 497 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding
that employer's statements concerning benefit withdrawal demonstrated unfair labor
practice).
121. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 618-20 (1969).
122. Id. at618.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309, 311-12 (1965).
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evidence. 126 Accordingly, reaching the point of an investigation will
often be necessary because the General Counsel will need
infonnation and facts in order to detennine the employer's purpose.
Such a detennination can be made only once there is investigation
into the facts of a specific dispute. 127 If the investigation does not
provide infonnation sufficient to detennine the employer's purpose,
then the General Counsel would be justified in issuing a complaint so
that additional facts could be ascertained through subpoenas and
hearings. 128
3. Mandatory Bargaining
Some refonners call for a mandatory duty to bargain over
management decisions to allocate capital to new plants. 129 Requiring
mandatory bargaining would constitute a departure from the position
put forth in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, where
Justice Stewart stated in his noteworthy concurrence,130 "Nothing the
Court holds ... should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain
collectively regarding ... managerial decisions, which lie at the core
of entrepreneurial control.,,131 Justice Stewart continued, "Decisions
concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope
of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of
employment .... "132 Under the NLRA, bargaining is mandatory

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id.
See id. at 312-13.
See National Labor Relations Act, 29 V.S.c. § 161 (2006).
See Estlund, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Miscimarra, supra note 29, at 85-86 n.28 (highlighting the prominence of
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion).
131. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 V.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart continued:
While employment security has thus properly been recognized in
various circumstances as a condition of employment, it surely
does not follow that every decision which may affect job security
is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining. Many decisions
made by management affect the job security of employees.
Decisions concerning the volume and kind of advertising
expenditures, product design, the manner of financing, and sales,
all may bear upon the security of the workers' jobs. Yet it is
hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve 'conditions of
employment' that they must be negotiated with the employees'
bargaining representative.
ld.
132. ld.
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with respect to terms and conditions of employment. 133 However,
"placement of new operations is a topic of 'permissive' bargaining,
over which the employer has no obligation to bargain with a union in
the first place.,,134 From the premise of this comment that there is no
unfair labor practice in a management decision to undertake a
walkaway shop,135 it necessarily follows that such a decision not be
subject to mandatory bargaining. Such a decision is both inherently
management's to make and not by itself violative of employees'
section 7 rights.
One scholar has recommended legislation "guaranteeing employees
significant input with respect to business decisions that directly affect
their employment situations.,,136 Certainly, a walkaway shop that is
accompanied by the purpose to chill union activity has a direct effect
on the unionized employees' employment situation. 137 A walkaway
shop that is not intended to have a chilling effect, on the other hand,
does not so clearly have a direct effect. 138 On one hand, the decision
could be direct if there are immediate changes at the existing
facility.139 On the other hand, the impact would be indirect if changes
come far down the road. 140 Indeed, when an employer reacts to the
exercise of section 7 activity in the immediate term, "returning
strikers [experience] alienation, frustration, anxiety, anger, and even
depression.,,141 It is true that these feelings can be experienced by
employees at an existing unionized plant that is not chosen for
additional work. 142 In Boeing, employees in the Puget Sound region
might feel alienated, frustrated, anxious, angry, and depressed
because management chose to invest in a new, non-union plant. But
if, as in Boeing, the unionized plant experienced an increase in
work,143 these sentiments should not be present. The magnitude, or
even the existence, of these feelings is likely far diminished when

133. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 689 (1981); see also Epstein, supra
note 29.
134. Epstein, supra note 29.
135. See id.
136. Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act at 75: In Need of a Heart
Transplant, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 311,347 (2010).
137. See Estiund, supra note 36, at 933.
138. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
139. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 933.
140. See id.
14l. Lyrissa C. Barnett, Maintaining Order in the Post-Strike Workplace: Employee
Expression and the Scope of Section 7, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 87, 102
(1994).
142. See Litvin, supra note 72, at 443.
143. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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there has been no immediate detrimental impact on the unionized
employees. Yes, employees at the unionized facility may experience
these sentiments, but they should reasonably understand that this is
not management impeding protected activity but making a legitimate
business decision.
The problem, as Estlund correctly points out, is that:
In general, firms tend to invest more capital and locate more
new production in non-union than in union plants; to
relocate existing production, gradually or more rapidly,
from union to non-union plants; and to favor largely
unorganized regions over regions where labor is strong. It
should therefore not be surprising that union operations are
disproportionately selected for closure, sometimes based on
higher labor costs, but often based on outmoded products
and product technology. The result of these patterns is a
steady flow of capital and jobs out of union operations. 144
But, is making all such management decisions an unfair labor
practice the answer? Estlund would say yes, because "[u]nion
avoidance in capital allocation decisions is the silent plague of the
Indeed, studies have shown that union
labor movement.,,145
avoidance reduces the likelihood of unionization at new plants. 146
There is a distinction between long-term labor avoidance that should
be the type of decision within the purview of managemene 47 and
144. Estlund, supra note 36, at 931-32.
145. Id. at 933.
146. See Thomas A. Kochan, Robert B. McKersie & Jon Chalykoff, The Effects of
Corporate Strategy and Workplace Innovations on Union Representation, 39 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 487,497-99 (1986) (discussing the impact of union avoidance on
organization efforts).
147. But see Estlund. supra note 36, at 943. Estlund frames the impact of capital allocation
decisions on existing plants when she writes:
[A] firm may choose to establish or expand a non-union plant
while withholding capital investment and new business or new
product lines from an existing plant. None of these decisions will
appear to discriminate against the union workers, or even to affect
them directly; none may even be actionable under the Act.
Ultimately, however, the antiquated plant will be a prime
candidate for shutdown; the shift of some or all of the work from
the older, less advanced, higher cost (union) location to the newer,
more modem, lower cost (non-union) location will be readily
justified on economic grounds without reference to the union.
Id. Estlund notes the difficulty in proving this long "train of events" and how that
difficulty makes section 8(a)(3) "ineffectual." Id. at 943 n.8\.
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capital-allocation decisions that may have the motive to chill
unionization at existing unionized facilities. 148
Thus, to Collingsworth, "a policy which emphasizes promoting
unfettered flexibility for capital no longer furthers the goals of the
NLRA.,,149 However, "many labor-management practices under the
NLRA were meant to have room to grow and develop.,,15o
Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that a management
decision to operate a new facility should be viewed differently today
than in the mid-twentieth century, or fifty years from now. 151
Professor Estlund frames the situation well:
But what constitutes a discriminatory motive? At one
extreme are employers who act out of pure spite, whose
desire for retaliation is untainted by instrumental motives
such as the desire to chill the union activity of its other
employees. Under the Darlington decision, an employer
who closes all or part of its business for purely retaliatory
reasons does not thereby violate Section 8(a)(3); only "a
purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of
the single employer" will suffice to establish an unlawful
discriminatory purpose. The sharply limited definition of
unlawful motive has been harshly and justifiably criticized,
though its impact is more limited than its critics might have
feared. This very narrow conception of the requisite
purpose does not apply to employer decisions to close only
some of the employer's operations at a given location, or to
transfer work to another location or to a subcontractor; as to
those decisions, proof of a desire to retaliate against
employees choosing union representation or simply to avoid
dealing with a union is sufficient to satisfy the motive
requirement of Section 8(a)(3).152
Thus, if the employer's purpose in opening a new plant instead of
adding the new work to the existing operation is made in part to chill
unionization and protected activity at the existing plant, such conduct
148. See id. at 945 ("The Court in First National Maintenance reaffirmed that even major
business decisions that are insulated from the duty to bargain ... are open to scrutiny
under section 8(a)(3) if they are alleged to be discriminatorily motivated .... ").
149. Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 76.
150. Charles 1. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 526 (1994).
151. See Hexter, supra note 71, at 305-06 (discussing how the world has changed since the
NLRA was passed).
152. Estlund, supra note 36, at 937-38.
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should be an unfair labor practice. 153 Howeverlf there is no purpose
to chill protected activity, however, then such management decisions
should not be an unfair labor practice.
Estlund would go further, stating, "the greater threat to employee
rights comes from those many large enterprises that patiently follow a
systematic, long run 'union avoidance' strategy for determining
patterns of investment.,,154 But applying an expanded version of the
Darlington test would alleviate Estlund' s concerns by providing
protection to workers where the employer is seeking to stifle
protected activity. 155
Mmaking walkaway shops per se unlawful or subject to mandatory
bargaining under the NLRA, however, would go too far in infringing
upon core management decisions. 156 Employers should be able to,
with limits, choose where to invest their dollars. If a slow,
methodical union-avoidance strategy is legal, then unions may have
to make some concessions in order to obtain new work. Unions can
also sell the concept of unionization at new plants. 157 But under the
long-term approach, the parties themselves will have to develop
strategies: the employer will have to make capital allocation
decisions, and the unionized facilities will have to compete for the
dollars.
4. Applying Estlund's Proposal to the Boeing Dispute
To see how Professor Estlund's proposal would play out, her
framework can be applied to the Boeing dispute. Under Estlund's
framework, Boeing's conduct would be measured against a
hypothetical non-discriminatory employer. 158 Boeing would be
expected to bargain with the lAM because the decision to open a new
facility in South Carolina instead of the Puget Sound region is one
that may affect job security.159 Estlund posits that "[ e]mployers who
view unions as legitimate partners in the enterprise would be
expected to bargain with unions over structural decisions that may

153. See id. at 937.
154. Id. at 945-46. Estlund continues, "The firm that bides its time and bites its tongue as
it shrinks or eliminates its unionized operations has little or nothing to fear from the
anti-discrimination mandate of the NLRA." Id. at 946.
155. See discussion supra Part N.C.I-2.
156. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2-3, IV.C.I-3.
157. See, e.g., About SEIV, SERVICE EMP. INT'L UNION, http://www.seiu.orglour-Union!
(last visited Dec. 11,2012).
158. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 981.
159. See id. at 942.
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affect job security ... because it is in their interest to maintain the
trust on which the cooperative enterprise is based.,,160 Estlund also
suggests that employers would be incentivized to negotiate regarding
capital allocation decisions because unions and employees "can affect
many of the factors that typically go into the profitability or viability
of operations.,,161
Conversely, Epstein has noted, "[O]ne reason why Boeing got into
trouble in this case was that it announced union difficulties, as
opposed to cost savings, as the reason for its decision to open the
South Carolina plant. Candor comes at a high cost in labor
relations." 162 The different perspectives raised by Estlund and
Epstein show why a partnership-type approach may not be
practical. 163
Returning to the analysis under Estlund's proposal, if Boeing made
a structural decision that may affect union jobs, without undergoing
good faith bargaining, there would be a presumption of anti -union
discrimination. 164 Boeing could then rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that negotiations would most likely have been
counterproductive. 165 Estlund's approach presumes that bargaining
would be beneficial for both parties, unless the employer could prove
otherwise. 166 Under this model, the burden to show that bargaining
would not be worthwhile is on the employer,167 even though this type
of decision has long been held to be management's to make. 168 The
real issue, however, is not about bargaining; it is about making a
fundamental choice: what should firmly be a management decision?
And then, even decisions that may impact unions, such as the
decision to locate new work to a new facility, should stay within
management's control. 169 Moreover, no unfair labor practice has
been found in situations where the employer relocated its plant for
economic reasons while also fulfilling its obligation to bargain. 170
Id. at 981.
Id.
Epstein, supra note 29.
Compare Epstein, supra note 29, with Estiund, supra note 36, at 960-61.
Estlund, supra note 36, at 983.
Id.
Id. at 983-84.
Id.
Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
Id. ("But we have consistently construed [8(a)(3)] to leave unscathed a wide range of
employer actions taken to serve legitimate business interests in some significant
fashion, even though the act committed may tend to discourage union membership.").
170. See, e.g., In re Fiss Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 125, 138, 154 (1942) (finding that the
employer relocated for economic reasons without neglecting its duty to bargain), affd

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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As Estlund has noted, "Employers are fighting for flexibility and
managerial prerogatives that they claim are crucial to their economic
survival, while unions are fighting for their very existence in the face
of aggressive managerial resistance and long-term attrition."l71 The
purpose of the NLRA, however, is to reduce industrial strife and to
give employees a voice.172 Additionally, the purpose of section
8(a)(3) is "to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join
unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining
any union without imperiling their livelihood.,,173
5. The Lawful Walkaway Shop
A premise of this comment is that long-term union avoidance
should not be seen as impacting employees in the exercise of their
right to join unions unless the management's purpose is to chill
unionism. 174 If an employer decides to create new work at a nonunion facility and does not intend to chill unionism, or as in Boeing,
increases the number of workers at the unionized facility, the
unionized employees' right to join a union is not being infringed
upon. 175
Thus, a distinction should be made. On one hand is the lawful
walkaway shop, a long-term union avoidance strategy demonstrated
by capital allocation decisions. 176 With a walkaway shop, a company
could act similarly to Boeing and create new work at a new facility
without any detriment to the existing unionized workers.
Management would be able to reference past strikes as part of the
justification for the decision. In making this distinction, this
comment has strived to find a balance that provides insulation to
management to make decisions that demonstrate long-term union
avoidance, while also protecting employees in situations in which the
employer's purpose is to chill unionism.177 Thus, employers should

171.
172.
173.

174.
175.
176.
177.

per curiam, 136 F .2d 990 (3d Cir. 1943); Kipbea Baking Co., 131 N .L.R.B. 411, 41417 (1961) (permitting an employer's decision to relocate for economic reasons after
providing advance notice to the union about its plans).
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
1527, 1543 (2002).
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § lSI (1994).
Julius Getman, The Boeing Case: Creating Outrage Out of Very Little, 27 AB.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 99,100 (2011) (quoting Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,
40 (1954)).
See discussion supra Part III.
Epstein, supra note 29.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.I-4.
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be able to follow long-tenn union avoidance strategies, not because
there is not the potential for such strategies to impact unionization
efforts, but because such decisions should be management's to
make. 178 To be sure, Estlund would take issue with this distinction,
having stated, "To allow the presence of the same 'economic
motives' that underlie the discharge of union activists to insulate
from liability 'union avoidance' in capital allocation decisions rests
on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of anti-union
conduct." I 79 This is not a misunderstanding, but simply a different
balancing of the rights of the stakeholders in management-labor
relations.
Furthennore, if masking union avoidance in long-tenn capital
allocation decisions is an unfair labor practice, then there very well
could be an impact on initial capital allocation decisions. 18o For both
existing companies with new products and legitimate needs for new
plants and new companies with new products, there will be strong
motivation to locate the facility in an area where unions lack strength
so that the employer is not confined in its decision making down the
road. 181 Otherwise, an employer who opens a new facility that will be
staffed by unionized workers soon after its opening will be hard
pressed to open new facilities with non-union employees because
such conduct will be seen as a step in long-tenn union avoidance. 182
This is an unnecessary restraint.
Additionally, it is important to remember that unions and
employers are not partners. 183 While they necessarily work together,
they have competing objectives and constituencies. 184 One need only
look to the outcome of the Boeing dispute to see that the current
process worked in that case. 185 This is not to say that unions should
178. Estlund has argued that "the same motive that lies at the heart of the paradigmatic
discriminatory discharge-a desire to avoid the real economic costs of unionizationalso underlies the larger patterns of investment and disinvestment that have
increasingly relegated private sector unions to aging plants in shrinking sectors of the
economy." Estlund, supra note 36, at 952. While this is a valid point, there is a
difference between what Estlund describes and long-term union avoidance, because
with the latter, there is not necessarily any negative impact on existing employees.
179. ld. at 963.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
181. See supra text accompanying note 146.
182. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
183. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981) ("Nonetheless, in
establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had
no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in
the running of the business enterprise in which the union's members are employed.").
184. ld.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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give up on what they are seeking or that there should be a race to the
bottom, but that certain decisions are inherently the employer's to
make, and even if this results in a hurdle for unions, that is part of the
price of capitalism. 186 Moreover, the union can gain leverage by
using the investigation to impose pressure on employers to settle. 187
The result is that the union will get some of what it wants, and there
can be a win-win for both the employer and employees. 188
There is some support for this contention from Professor Estlund,
who recognizes what motivates employers when she writes, "The
best defense of current doctrine sanctioning 'economically
motivated' decisions about the allocation and relocation of capital is
that it is simply inescapable-that employers must be free in a market
economy to move capital from less profitable to more profitable
uses.,,189 An expanded NLRA that precludes an employer from
allocating capital away from unions in a slow manner could impede
this conduct. It is not mutually exclusive to have a system that
promotes unionization and worker rights while also recognizing
certain employer prerogatives. 190
Even if one agrees with Estlund's proposals and sentiments, the
idea of precluding an employer from opening a new facility in order
to avoid a union would be a slippery slope. As the Boeing dispute
illustrates, the flexibility afforded the General Counsel in issuing a
complaint may accomplish what Estlund is seeking-that a broader
array of employer conduct will trigger an investigation of employer
conduct because of the direct and indirect effects on employee
rights. 191 But, taking Estlund's argument to its logical extension
would be a bridge too far in limiting employer conduct. To be fair,
Estlund tempers her recommendations when stating,
While an aim of both New Deal economic policy and the
modem economists I have relied upon was and is to
discourage primary reliance on a low-wage, anti-union
strategy by American firms, neither calls for prohibiting
management from any consideration of labor costs or other
economic consequences of unionization in its effort to
186. See discussion supra Part IV.C.I-4.
187. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965) (discussing how the
Board can intrude upon area that employers and employees "can use in seeking to
gain acceptance of their bargaining demands").
188. See Feinstein, supra note 3.
189. Estlund, supra note 36, at 946.
190. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
19l. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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compete. To do so would give union workers a kind of
tenure protection against market forces that affect union and
non-union firms alike. I do not contend that the Act was
meant to do this. \92
On the other hand, scholars at the conservative Heritage
Foundation have suggested that Congress affirm that new capital
investment decisions do not violate the Act. 193 While clarity is
certainly needed in this regard, amending the NLRA is probably not a
feasible solution, at least given the current makeup of Congress. 194
Moreover, some flexibility should remain in the Act so that the
NLRB can pursue investigations of alleged unfair labor practices.
And as previously discussed, some new investment decisions do
infringe upon protected employee activity.195 Therefore, a categorical
exemption is unwarranted. Indeed, it should be noted that by issuing
the complaint, the General Counsel was not finding Boeing liable for
any conduct; this was merely a step in the adjudicative process. 196
And given the valid concerns raised by Professor Estlund,197 it would
be an overstep to close the door entirely to finding an unfair labor
practice in all new capital investment decisions. Following the
suggestion made by the Heritage Foundation's scholars is unlikely
because amending the NLRA has historically been a difficult task. 198

192. Estlund, supra note 36, at 979. Estlund continues, "The question is how to distinguish
prohibited from permissible conduct in a way that takes proper account of the Act's
prohibition of much economically rational resistance to and discrimination against
union employees without imposing unwarranted restraints on management's ability to
respond to market conditions." Id.
193. Hans A. von Spakovsky & James Sherk, National Labor Relations Board Overreach
Against Boeing Imperils Jobs and Investment, HERJTAGE FOUND. (May 11, 2011),
http://report.heritage.orgllm0066 ("Congress should amend the National Labor
Relations Act to reaffirm the long-standing construction ... that any new investment
decisions-such as (but not limited to) expanding existing facilities, building new
plants, or relocating-are not unfair labor practices and are outside the legal
jurisdiction of an overzealous NLRB. ").
194. See Estlund, supra note 171, at 1530 ("Most importantly, a longstanding political
impasse at the national level has blocked any major congressional revision of the
basic text since at least 1959. Moreover, the basic text itself, almost all of which dates
from either 1935 or 1947, contains additional built-in obstacles to change.").
195. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
196. See Feinstein, supra note 3.
197. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 971-77.
198. Estlund, supra note 171, at 1530.
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V. CONCLUSION
While the facts of the Boeing case strongly point to there being no
unlawful transfer of work,199 there certainly could be instances of
long-tenn union avoidance that at the very least warrant
investigation. 20o In such a scenario, if an employer makes a decision
to open a new plant instead of expanding work at an existing location
with the then purpose of chilling union activity, there will be a
finding of an unfair labor practice under a modified version of the test
for partial closings. 201 However, if a walkaway shop has no purpose
to chill unionism, there should be no finding of an unfair labor
practice. 202
An amendment to the NLRA such as that recommended by von
Spakovsky and Sherk203 would preclude any remedy under the NLRA
for any of the above mentioned scenarios, so their suggestion to
eliminate certain unfair labor practices should be rejected because of
the possibility of the illegal walkaway shop.204 A management
decision to create new work at a new facility should not, by itself,
constitute an unfair labor practice. 205 However, if such a decision is
accompanied by threats that reveal a purpose to chill protected
activity, or if the decision is accompanied by a proximate negative
impact on the existing employees, then the current test for partial
relocations provides a helpful starting point for detennining whether
there has been an unfair labor practice. 206 Certainly, a decision to
open a new plant may chill union activity at an existing plant, but this
is not a foregone conclusion. 207
Although it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an
employer plans to close a union operation a decade down the road,
that should not preclude an employer from being able to make core
entrepreneurial decisions. 208 Under the NLRA, management does and
should have the right to choose how to run its business, and the
NLRA's authority should not be expanded to remove the ability to
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See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
See discussion supra Part IV .B-C.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.S.
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.4-S.
See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.4-S.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.4-S.
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make such decisions from employers. 209 The union will have to work
to organize the new facility and the cycle continues. But that is a
better course than so severely curtailing decisions that are rightly
management's to make.
Garrett Wozniak*

209. See discussion supra Part IV.
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